Political economy by Güven, Ali Burak
BIROn - Birkbeck Institutional Research Online
Guven, Ali Burak (2019) Political economy. In: Ozerdem, A. and Whiting,
M. (eds.) Routledge Handbook of Turkish Politics. London, UK: Routledge.
ISBN 9781138500556. (In Press)
Downloaded from: https://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/id/eprint/25523/
Usage Guidelines:
Please refer to usage guidelines at https://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/policies.html or alternatively
contact lib-eprints@bbk.ac.uk.
1 
This is a forthcoming chapter in Routledge Handbook of Turkish Politics,  
eds. Matthew Whiting and Alpaslan Özerdem. London: Routledge. 









ABSTRACT This chapter highlights the interplay of policy regimes, external forces, 
institutions and crises in the evolution of Turkish political economy. Following a brief 
overview of Turkey’s state-led development strategy in the 1950s and 1960s and efforts at 
liberalization in the 1980s and 1990s, the chapter focuses on the post-2002 AKP period. 
Initial successes during this period proved unsustainable and Turkey, once branded a leading 
emerging power, has over the past decade experienced intensified foreign capital-
dependence, sluggish growth, institutional degeneration and recently severe macroeconomic 
instability. With the AKP’s authoritarian brand of neoliberal populism firmly entrenched, 
Turkey’s long-term development prospects in an ever more challenging global economic 
context remain bleak. 
 
 
Turkish political economy is complex, but hardly exceptional. A middle-income 
country (MIC) unable to consolidate its fragile democracy for the past 70 years, Turkey has 
been shaped by much the same dynamics and constraints as its peers in the semi-periphery of 
global capitalism. Four continuously interacting forces have determined its evolutionary 
fortunes. First, different socio-political, cross-class coalitions have underpinned distinct 
economic policy regimes in different periods, with formative implications for distributive 
politics. Second, external market and policy forces have produced powerful constraints upon 
economic policy. These range from shifts in international prices to patterns of market 
integration, the preferences of foreign investors, the rules of the global economy and direct 
policy constraints stemming from intergovernmental creditors. Third, the institutional context 
has proved crucial. Amongst the main items to list are the broad features of the political 
system such as democratic quality and bureaucratic capacity as well as arrangements 
governing specific sectors and policy domains. Fourth, economic performance, in particular 
frequent economic crises and downturns, have led to revisions in policy regimes and 
underlying coalitions, reconfigured international constraints, and inspired initiatives for 
institutional reform. Each of these four forces (policy regimes, external constraints, 
institutions, and crises) will figure abundantly in this chapter. 
The point is straightforward: Despite occasional bouts of high performance, Turkey is 
yet to find a sustainable way of overcoming its deep-seated developmental challenges. In 
fact, over the past decade it has been travelling in the opposite direction, and is today ever 
more deeply ensnared in a middle-income trap coupled with growing macroeconomic 
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instability that also complicates its escape from looming authoritarianism. The following 
section provides an overview of the trajectory of Turkey’s political economy from 
independence to the turn of the century. Next it analyses the post-2002 period under 
successive AKP governments, which was initially characterized by a reformist phase with 
promising outcomes but later degenerated into a combination of patronage politics, electoral 
populism and low institutional quality typical in the global South. The chapter concludes with 
a brief examination of Turkey’s possible futures as an emerging power in a rapidly 
transforming global economy. 
 
 
From State-Led Development to Reluctant Neoliberalism 
 
 Political economists have often considered Turkey an important case to study various 
dimensions of capitalist development in the semi-periphery (Trimberger 1978; Waterbury 
1993; Waldner 1999). The absence of a potentially hindering colonial legacy, the 
consolidated power of modernizing political elites, a relatively capacious public bureaucracy 
built on a long state tradition, and amicable relations with leading Western nations made the 
country a good candidate for successful development. Turkey did not wholly fulfil this 
potential, though it managed to build a respectable economic base by the end of the century. 
 Turkish economic policy until the 1980s relied on a mixed-economy model that 
afforded the state a central role. The state not only fostered private capitalist development via 
trade protectionism and various subsidies, but it directly participated in economic life through 
large state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in most sectors (banking, mining, agriculture, heavy 
industry from steel to chemicals, and even basic consumer goods). It is noteworthy that, on 
closer inspection, Turkey’s state-led developmentalism did not constitute a monolithic path 
but comprised three different policy phases (Öniş and Şenses 2007). The etatism of the 
interwar period introduced central planning and large-scale public industrial investment. This 
was followed, in the 1950s, by a relatively liberal interlude during which successive 
Democrat Party (DP) governments aimed to integrate Turkey into the world economy 
principally via agricultural exports. By contrast the 1960s and 1970s saw a decisive return to 
planning and a concerted effort towards import substituting industrialization (ISI). The period 
1962-1976 marked the golden age of the ISI, during which annual GDP growth averaged 6 
per cent and living standards improved noticeably, especially in urban centers. 
 State-led development had wide-ranging distributional, institutional and international 
correlates. The transition to multiparty politics in 1946 rendered distributive politics an 
integral part of economic policy making, as manifested in the DP’s successful effort in the 
early 1950s to bring together large landowners, small farmers and a fledgling private sector 
on a broadly market-oriented platform. The classic phase of ISI (1960s and 1970s) required a 
more complex coalitional setting and balanced a wider range of collective interests, including 
the metropolitan industrial bourgeoisie that received tariff protection and various subsidies, 
organised labour that enjoyed rapidly rising wages, and a growing urban, secular middle class 
that formed the backbone of an expanding bureaucracy (Keyder 1987). Meanwhile rural 
producers, in particular the electorally significant peasantry, were compensated for via an 
agricultural subsidy regime put in the service of populist redistribution. Also noteworthy 
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during this period was the rapid growth of Marmara-based large conglomerates in the form of 
family holdings, with considerable dependence on and connections with bureaucratic 
policymakers in Ankara. State-business relations increasingly mattered (Buğra 1994). 
 Such a mixed economy entailed a stupendous state machinery, as exemplified in the 
large number of SOEs, and the complex web of state and parastate organizations mandated 
with allocating agricultural subsidies. Equally important were the emergence of an elite 
economic bureaucracy with some pockets of expertise, efficiency and autonomy (mainly 
within the State Planning Organization, the Central Bank, and the Ministry of Finance), and 
the steady construction of modern public services, from higher education to an expansive 
social security system by developing country standards. Internationally, meanwhile, Turkey’s 
interventionist model mirrored the accepted postwar Keynesian wisdom, and its policy path 
evolved in a context of close relations with international financial institutions (IFIs) such as 
the IMF and the World Bank. By the 1970s Turkey was the archetypal semi-peripheral 
economy, having built some manufacturing capacity in consumer goods, but characterized by 
only moderate integration with the international economy, exporting mainly primary 
commodities, importing a bit more in capital goods (for example, machinery) and 
intermediate goods (for example, oil), and thereby often running modest current account 
deficits leading to chronic foreign exchange shortages. 
 The collapse of inward-oriented, state-directed developmentalism was therefore 
conditioned as much by this external imbalance, further amplified during the oil price hikes 
and international turmoil of the 1970s, as by the inherent contradictions of the model (Barkey 
1990). In turn the crisis of 1978-79 provided the catalyst for a radical change in policy. With 
the broad ISI coalition no longer sustainable and sovereign debt soaring, technocratic 
policymakers turned to the IMF and the World Bank, which had already begun to promote 
orthodox neoliberal ideas of policy reform via stringent policy conditionality in their clients.  
  Turkey’s early phase of market transition, from 1980 roughly until 1987, rested on a 
straightforward template of fiscal stabilisation, deregulation, and trade as well as domestic 
financial liberalisation under successive IMF stabilisation and World Bank structural 
adjustment programmes. The principal policy aims during this phase, led after 1983 by Prime 
Minister Turgut Özal and his Motherland Party (ANAP) governments, were to balance public 
finances, eliminate excessive subsidies and price distortions, foster private investment, and 
gradually steer the economy towards an outward-looking, export-oriented model, while 
avoiding politically difficult reform items such as privatisation. The result was relative 
macroeconomic stability and reasonably fast growth rates, although the transformative impact 
of these measures on the structure of the Turkish economy was debatable (Arıcanlı and 
Rodrik 1990). Crucially, the transition to a market-oriented policy regime took place in the 
semi-authoritarian political context that followed the 1980 coup, and was thus largely 
unburdened by the need to rely on a broad coalition of attendant collective interests.   
 The revival of competitive politics by 1987 augmented the electoral salience of the 
distributive grievances of social segments left behind by the early phase of market reform 
(virtually all interests, bar big business). At the same time, capital account liberalization in 
1989 led to rapid integration with international financial markets, ushering in a flexible 
context for managing fiscal deficits. The combination of the two proved lethal as a succession 
of weak coalition governments throughout the 1990s relied on external capital flows through 
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an under-regulated banking system to address intense redistributive demands from below 
with old-style populist side payments—generous agricultural subsidies and noticeably 
improved wages and salaries. In a context of poor macroeconomic management, this cycle 
led to a series of interconnected ailments, including high inflation, deteriorating public 
finances, a highly fragile financial system, and sluggish industrial development, together 
producing boom-and-bust cycles of foreign capital-dependent growth (Cizre-Sakallıoğlu and 
Yeldan 2000). The 1994 shock had already illustrated the perils of combining premature 
financial internationalization with fiscal mismanagement and regulatory forbearance. Failed 
reform efforts in the rest of the decade and an ill-designed IMF program in 1999 only 
accelerated Turkey’s downward spiral, culminating in a dual fiscal and banking crisis in 2001 
with far-reaching political-economic consequences (Akyüz and Boratav 2003; Öniş and 
Rubin 2003). 
 Although Turkey’s first brush with ‘neoliberal globalism’ ended in crisis, in hindsight 
this record was neither out of step with the experience of other large MICs given the string of 
financial meltdowns from Argentina and Brazil to Russia and East Asia, nor did Turkey’s 
market reforms prove socially as devastating as the ‘lost decades’ of orthodox neoliberalism 
in Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa, and most countries in Central and Eastern Europe. 
Note also that, at around 4 per cent per year, Turkish GDP growth in the retrospectively 
much-demonised 1990s was not far behind its historical average and was even faster than in 
the decade immediately prior to our examination (2007-2016). Seen this way, Turkey’s most 
critical problem was its failure to adapt its economic governance and institutions to the 
exigencies of a liberalising policy regime and the emergent external constraints of global 
integration. This adaptive task would fall on the post-crisis policymakers and require a new 
round of intense engagement with the IFIs.  
 
 
The Political Economy of the AKP Era 
 
 How did Turkish political economy evolve under AKP rule and what are its 
contemporary characteristics? These questions are addressed in the three sub-sections below, 
by first looking at the party’s reformist inaugural term in office (2002-2007), then examining 
the troublesome past decade, and finally by reflecting on some enduring structural 
challenges. 
 
The AKP’s First Term: A Reformist Half-Decade under Dual External Anchors 
 
 By the time the AKP rose to power in late 2002, Turkey had already been 
implementing a comprehensive IMF and World Bank-designed recovery programme. Led by 
Kemal Derviş, a former World Bank vice-president called to duty by the preceding coalition 
government, the scope of this programme went well beyond the usual monetary and fiscal 
stabilisation measures, and included sweeping institutional reforms in domains ranging from 
banking regulation and debt management to fiscal transparency and anti-corruption. As such, 
Turkey’s post-crisis reforms reflected the post-Washington Consensus in mainstream 
development wisdom at the time, which complemented the market-orientation of the 
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neoliberal paradigm with a wider reform agenda that focused on good governance, sound 
regulatory institutions, and social sustainability (Öniş and Şenses 2005; Rodrik 2006). 
 Two main characteristics of this period placed structural constraints upon policy 
despite the AKP’s unchallenged parliamentary majority. First, the externally-led reform 
process empowered the economic bureaucracy, in particular the Treasury and the Central 
Bank, which were now able to exert greater autonomy from everyday political interference. 
The rapid proliferation of independent regulatory agencies, in particular the Banking 
Regulation and Supervision Agency but also others in various sectors from energy to 
agriculture, should also be regarded in this light. Second, Turkey’s IFI-led reforms coincided 
with an optimistic phase in its EU accession talks. In the run-up to and in the immediate 
aftermath of the start of its full membership negotiations in 2006, various efforts at political 
but also sectoral harmonization with the EU created a supplementary layer of constraint. The 
IMF and the EU thereby operated as double external anchors for economic policy throughout 
the AKP’s first term in office (Öniş and Bakır 2007). 
 In hindsight, these distinct policy limitations were beneficial for the party to cobble 
together a broad political coalition. The AKP’s organic support relied on the small and 
medium-sized conservative Anatolian entrepreneurs. During the 2002 elections it had also 
managed to invoke the frustrations of the crises-stricken urban and rural poor. To add to this 
wide political base, its inescapable toeing of the IMF-EU line on critical matters (from 
monetary policy, debt management and regulatory reforms to the democratization process) 
during its initial years in office helped the party garner the provisional, though active, support 
of İstanbul-based big business as well as the acquiescence of secular, urban middle classes. 
What was less visible during this period of uncharacteristic political calm and optimism, 
though, was the AKP’s selective implementation of the IFI-led reforms. While banking, fiscal 
and monetary reforms proceeded ahead and a major privatization drive continued apace, the 
party sought to either dilute or reverse reformist initiatives in policy domains that would 
likely undermine the interests of its organic constituency. Crucial among these were the 
changes to the age-old agricultural subsidy regime and the anti-corruption, and especially 
public procurement, reforms (Güven 2012). 
 
 
< TABLE 1 ROUGHLY HERE > 
 
 
 The macro outcomes of this broadly reformist period were promising, with GDP 
growth hitting record levels in 2004-06 (Table 1). Meanwhile foreign direct investment 
soared, fiscal balance improved significantly, and consumer inflation fell to single digits for 
the first time since the 1970s. 
Yet this half decade should also be placed in its proper comparative and analytic 
context. The period in question marked a high point in the global economy, with record 
increases in trade and financial flows and an uncharacteristically cheap US dollar providing a 
boost to most economies. Note especially that, Turkey’s average GDP growth of just under 7 
per cent per annum in 2002-2007 was indeed a tad slower than that of low-income countries 
(LICs) and MICs as a group — in comparative terms Turkey was not a high performer. More 
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crucially, Turkey’s apparent macroeconomic success harboured key weaknesses: growth was 
still driven by high trade and current account deficits and was therefore dependent on a 
steady flow of foreign capital, whereas the rate of unemployment remained high at above 10 
per cent throughout the period. 
 
Global Crisis and Reform Fatigue: Stagnation under Institutional Degeneration 
 
 The global economic crisis of 2008-09 was a watershed in Turkish political economy 
in terms of both bringing about shifts in policy trajectories and exposing its structural 
weaknesses. Turkey was hit hard by the crisis, recording a steep GDP decline in 2009, yet its 
response diverged significantly from other large MICs in that it was quite delayed and 
piecemeal. On the one hand, despite a favourable fiscal position, the Turkish government 
adopted a very weak stimulus package and stuck instead with fiscal conservatism, relying on 
a hodgepodge of limited measures announced late into the crisis. On the other hand, after 
extensive negotiations it rejected a new standby agreement with the IMF, emphasizing policy 
independence (Öniş and Güven 2011). Indeed it is this tendency to insist on home-grown 
solutions without a cohesive, let alone transformative, vision that has characterized Turkish 
economic policy over the past decade. Rapid recovery in 2010-11 amidst continuing 
problems in the North provided further justification for staying on this unadventurous path. 
 On closer inspection, the Turkish economy faced mounting structural challenges. The 
swift post-crisis recovery was made possible only with soaring current account deficits, 
meaning recovery relied on the country’s conventional growth model characterized by 
import-driven, foreign capital-dependent domestic consumption. This ‘overheating’ ended in 
2012-13, after which growth rates dipped below Turkey’s long-term average (Table 1). In the 
meantime, per capita income remained stable around the US $10,000 mark that had been 
reached just before the crisis, and no noticeable improvement was recorded in either inflation 
or unemployment. In short, the half-decade that followed the recovery from the global crisis 
was for all practical purposes a period of economic stagnation marked by policy paralysis and 
reform fatigue that failed to overcome the country’s long-standing foreign-capital 
dependence (Güven 2016). 
While ‘revised’ GDP figures from the Turkish Statistical Institute indicate a mini 
growth spurt in 2016-17, in actuality economic fundamentals have deteriorated sharply in 
recent years, given especially the growing foreign debt of the private sector. Crucially, in a 
context of decreasing global appetite for financial flows to emerging countries on the one 
hand, and international political tensions stemming largely from the AKP’s questionable 
domestic and foreign policy preferences, on the other, Turkey’s unresolved structural 
problems ushered in a sizeable economic jolt in 2018. At the time of this writing (September 
2018), Turkey appears to be on the brink of a devastating crisis, which so far has already seen 
a dramatic decline in the value of the lira that only magnifies the country’s foreign 
obligations, skyrocketing consumer inflation that for the first time since 2003 topped 20 per 
cent, a steep rise in unemployment threatening the most vulnerable, and an accelerating wave 
of bankruptcies wreaking havoc amongst retail and manufacturing firms alike. However the 
present storm may unfold (and many economists expect sustained recession in 2018-19), 
there is little doubt that Turkey’s current economic model is broken beyond repair.       
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In the background of that model are two major shifts that have defined Turkish 
political economy over the past decade. The first is the dynamic social and coalitional basis 
of economic policy, resting on a complex set of cross-class relations. The second is acute 
institutional degeneration, with potentially adverse long-term consequences. In terms of 
harnessing the support of the popular classes, the AKP has long adopted a well-calibrated, 
pragmatist strategy that combines active welfare policies, improvements in public services 
and targeted populist redistribution without putting fiscal-financial stability too much at risk. 
Scholars have variously depicted this hybrid path as ‘neoliberal populism’ (Bozkurt 2013) 
and ‘social neoliberalism’ (Dorlach 2016). This strategy has ensured the steady support of 
wide segments of the urban and rural poor that are often already drawn to the AKP’s brand of 
social conservatism, although it has also came at the expense of significant ‘flexibilization’ in 
labour markets and consolidation of an oppressive, anti-trade union labour regime. For a 
while neoliberal populism looked to have empowered the poor economically, but it also led 
to political disempowerment and systemic vulnerability in an increasingly financialized 
setting marked by soaring household indebtedness.      
The party’s connections with elite interests have proved less stable. The government’s 
weak response to the global crisis in 2008-09 as well as its declining reformist appetite, 
diminished endorsement of the EU process and weakened commitment to democratic 
consolidation gradually eroded the conditional support it once received from İstanbul-based 
big business organized under the Turkish Business and Industry Association (TÜSİAD). In 
turn, the party sought to systematically favour smaller, often conservative, capital factions 
loyal to its cause via growing circles of patronage and nepotism. Some observers argue that 
this selective nurturing of alternative economic elites is bound to create a ‘new capitalism’ 
that places culture and loyalty at the centre of state-business relations (Buğra and Savaşkan 
2014). The wider implications of that dynamic are briefly discussed in the next section.  
 Second, rampant institutional degeneration has accompanied the excessive 
politicization of state-business relations and erosion of democratic checks and balances. 
Signs of institutional weakening were already present as the government, especially after the 
conclusion of the IMF constraint in 2008, moved to openly undermine the autonomy of 
independent regulatory agencies (Özel 2012). The multiple overlapping political crises of the 
past few years augmented these institutional strains dramatically. Problems here are 
numerous. Until recently Turkey was not considered a particularly corrupt polity in 
developing country standards, but that perception changed rapidly over the past few years as 
exemplified not only in the 17-25 December 2013 crisis which the government to date 
portrays as a Gülenist plot to implicate ministers, but in the forced resignations in late 2017 
of the AKP-affiliated mayors of Ankara and İstanbul over undisclosed abuses of office as 
well. More common and problematic perhaps is the emphasis on open political loyalty, or at 
least full acquiescence, as the price of doing business with the government, from winning 
public tenders to the issuance of basic permits. Compounding this picture is the increasingly 
opaque state of public finances. The conventional Court of Accounts monitoring of public 
spending is now a largely dysfunctional process, whereas the country’s newly instituted 
sovereign fund (Turkey Wealth Fund), which now holds the assets of many large state 
institutions, lacks any meaningful transparency and is controlled directly by the presidential 
office. To most critics this state of affairs is tightly linked to Erdoğan’s efforts to centralize 
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power in the presidency and shape the civil service, both in structure and personnel, 
accordingly. This was made easier under the current emergency rule that witnessed the 
dismissal of tens of thousands of civil servants and a severe erosion of the rule of law as well 
as any semblance of judicial independence. The rubberstamping of Erdoğan’s unchecked 
powers at the June 2018 elections and the ongoing state reorganization that brought his son-
in-law, Berat Albayrak, to the helm of the economy have only accelerated this process. The 
result is a generalized decline in not just bureaucratic autonomy but also capacity, which 
political economists typically consider key to effective policymaking and implementation. 
 Since the global crisis Turkish political economy ironically evolved on a trajectory 
very similar to its much-maligned character in the 1990s: staccato growth, political 
turbulence, reform paralysis and now intense macroeconomic instability. The obvious 
difference is that there is no discernable political urgency and will to substantive change, 
especially under democratic backsliding. Consequently, Turkey’s fundamental developmental 
and policy challenges remain unresolved and aggravated, although they are now manifested 
under new guises and subject to new dynamics, as discussed below. 
 
Foreign Capital-Dependence, Sectoral Pathways, and Mass Politics     
 
 The key developmental constraint for Turkey is its foreign capital-dependent, private 
consumption-oriented growth pattern. The Turkish economy is capable of attaining fast 
growth rates only via dramatic increases in import-led domestic consumption that has the side 
effect of producing unsustainably high current account deficits financed via foreign funds. In 
turn, periods of external rebalancing often coincide with a decline in aggregate demand and 
thus marked by growth decelerations, washing away the gains of episodic high growth. In the 
meantime, foreign indebtedness steadily mounts: Turkey’s gross foreign debt stock (public 
and private) quadrupled since 2002, not so much during the global crisis but rather during 
growth spells (see Table 1). For many decades governments of variegated political stripes 
have failed to overcome this constraint, for addressing the problem is a formidable task, 
which in essence requires upgrading the production profile of the Turkish economy. In effect, 
this means focusing systematically on the manufacturing of higher value-added goods that lie 
at the technological frontier and impart a strategic advantage in international trade. Yet the 
share of high-technology manufactures in Turkish exports are consistently under 3-4 per cent, 
with the economy facing the threat of ‘premature deindustrialization’ (Bakır, Özçelik, Özmen 
and Taşıran 2017). Smaller economies may have other routes to prosperity, but no large 
economy has managed to move into the high-income range without openly adopting such a 
strategy of selective, concerted industrial upgrading.  
 The problem is that the reasonably clear requirements of such a path pose economic 
risks and, more importantly perhaps, are utterly unpalatable in the current political juncture. 
Selective high-tech industrial upgrading in the Turkish context would depend on tackling the 
sluggish pace of productivity growth, radically strengthening the R&D infrastructure, and 
reducing the import-dependence of the main exporting sectors. But attaining these goals 
would entail redirection of resources towards business and social segments that have fallen 
outside the AKP’s electoral coalition, that is, the metropolitan bourgeoisie with established 
advantages in productivity and in access to foreign markets, and urban-secular middle classes 
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as potentially the main human capital behind such a drive. Most development economists 
would also cite stringent institutional requisites, such as an independent and efficient 
judiciary and a meritocratic, autonomous bureaucracy to oversee a dynamic policy regime 
free from everyday political interference. Yet the political dynamics that have kept the AKP 
in power since the global crisis indicate a different combination of societal and institutional 
preferences as already discussed. To round off this examination, two closely interlinked 
points need to be underlined — one about sectoral imbalances and the other mass politics. 
 On the sectoral side, banking and construction have been the main winners of 
Turkey’s foreign capital-dependent, consumption-based growth path. The net effect of the 
post-2001 regulatory reforms has been to consolidate the banking sector and reorient major 
private banks towards traditional retail banking, that is, deposit taking and credit allocation. 
In particular, rapid growth of high-interest consumer credit in the system from 2004 onwards 
led to a significant increase in bank profitability. Likewise, construction proved to be a highly 
prized sector, and has been supported actively through both public tenders towards large 
infrastructure projects and new regulations facilitating house-building, as in the ‘urban 
transformation’ initiative. Along with mining, this focus on construction has also allowed 
successive AKP governments to selectively allocate resources to government-friendly capital 
factions (Gürakar 2016), some of which have later moved into mass media with the principal 
aim of trumpeting the party line and controlling the news flow. This is not to say Turkish 
manufacturing, including the Marmara-based captains of industry, has done badly under the 
AKP, for capacity kept growing steadily thanks to both an expanding domestic market and 
the unfettered access to the massive European market thanks to the EU customs union. Even 
then, it is what economists term ‘non-tradable sectors’ that have benefited disproportionately 
from the growth pattern outlined. 
 Finance and construction also play significant roles for sustaining the AKP’s electoral 
appeal. The expansion of credit markets has had formative consequences. It transformed 
living standards and practices, positively by facilitating accelerated home ownership and 
providing flexibility in the use of disposable income, but over time by also creating excessive 
dependence for wage earners (Karaçimen 2014). Likewise, most firms have grown dependent 
on a continuous stream of bank credit for everyday operations. These perils prompted 
government activism, first in perennial efforts to rein in personal indebtedness around 2014-
15, but more distinctly in the 2017 Credit Guarantee Fund initiative, a scheme that accorded 
partial public guarantees for private firms’ liabilities to banks, which helped prevent a much-
feared wave of bankruptcies especially amongst SMEs. Likewise, construction is a politically 
critical sector for the AKP as it leads to improvements in public services via large-scale 
transportation projects, ensures continuous renewal and expansion of the housing stock often 
to the benefit of middle and lower-middle classes, provides sustained demand for unskilled 
and semi-skilled manual labour, and finally has strong backward and forward linkages to 
various other manufacturing sectors, with significant positive spillover effects across the 
economy. If targeted side-payments via an expanded welfare regime has been the visible face 
of the AKP’s ‘controlled populism’ (Öniş 2012; Aytaç 2014), ever expanding credit markets 
and various construction-related activity constitute its chief sectoral engines. Construction 
and banking have also initially received preferential policy attention during the current crisis, 
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although the former at the time of writing is at a standstill whereas it is yet too early to gauge 
the extent to which policymakers can shield the banking system from the fallout of the crisis.  
 These sectoral and social manifestations of Turkey’s current growth pattern are so 
politically intertwined and institutionally entrenched that it is difficult to fathom a path for an 
alternative, genuinely developmental policy regime to emerge. Their main benefit has been to 
assist successive AKP governments in managing distributive and regional strains without 
undermining fiscal sustainability or financial stability amidst intensified political turbulence. 
Yet this capacity to contain distributive tensions, in part via ideology and crude identity 
politics, comes with a hefty price tag of also reinforcing a fragile economic model and, more 
crucially, enabling the country’s steady descent into authoritarianism.   
 
  
Pathways from the Semi-Periphery: Turkey as an Emerging Power 
 
 It is useful to conclude the discussion by placing the evolution of Turkish political 
economy in its comparative-international context and pondering its possible futures from that 
vantage point. Its ongoing developmental challenges notwithstanding, Turkey today is 
classified as an emerging country — one of several large MICs whose increased share of the 
world economy is creating a fundamental shift in the balance of global economic power. This 
new status, it must be underlined, is not the result of some outstanding performance but, as in 
the case of most other economies in that category with the obvious exception of China, 
mainly reflected continued long-term differentials in rates of output and population growth 
with countries in the global North. This increased relative size has brought with it many 
advantages: a larger domestic market to attract international investors, greater opportunities 
for international trade, and membership of the Group of 20 (G20), the main 
intergovernmental platform of global economic governance. It has also prompted the AKP 
government to adopt an increasingly proactive stance in foreign economic policy, from 
seeking opportunities for regional economic and political leadership to nurturing stronger 
South-South trade relations and development cooperation and, where possible, displaying 
policy independence from Northern multilaterals such as the IMF (Öniş and Kutlay 2013). 
Such activism is consistent with the policy choices of other rising countries.                
 What are the prospects for Turkey in this new global context? The benign though 
unlikely scenario is for Turkey to somehow find the political wherewithal to wean itself from 
its extant growth model, and reorient its production profile to maximize the gains from its 
comparative advantage in geography, human capital and existing industrial infrastructure. 
Given the picture painted in the previous section, even a modest shift in that direction would 
require a new broad-based policy coalition to be negotiated democratically. It would also 
likely necessitate significant rebuilding of institutions, from reintroducing fiscal transparency 
to restoring the rule of law. Turkey’s current income and distribution dynamics allow for 
sufficient socioeconomic space for such a reorientation, and the international context, despite 
indicating a tighter global market, is ideationally as conducive as it ever has been in the age 
of neoliberal globalism for an emerging country to experiment with targeted industrial policy. 
Yet political realities on the ground appear to preclude such a bold escape.  
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 The likely yet darker scenario, almost solely on grounds of political feasibility, is the 
continuation of the pre-existing trajectory in one form or another. While the Turkish 
economy might yet navigate the current storm with minimal damage and resume muddling 
through as it did over the past decade, this is also a path fraught with perils. A distinct danger 
here is the institutionalization of authoritarianism post-2019, which would not be out of step 
with the current global context of democratic recession and authoritarian resilience (Bermeo 
2016). It has become fashionable for autocrats in emerging countries to shun Western norms 
of democratic governance as some elite-driven neo-colonial imposition. This vision is 
consistent with the AKP’s emergent brand of ‘authoritarian neoliberal populism.’ However, 
such a model is bound to pose significant long-term risks to the economy — by scaring away 
FDI, accelerating the brain drain, further undermining bureaucratic capacity, and debilitating 
the business climate. 
 A more imminent danger at the time of writing, and assuming the current downturn 
will not evolve into full blown political crisis, is renewed overconfidence in the sustainability 
of foreign capital-dependence and subsequent policy lethargy that will only magnify existing 
blind spots. Despite steady growth for the past half century, Turkey continues to suffer from 
characteristic developing-country ailments, such as low rates of female labour force 
participation, extreme inter-regional inequality, massive environmental degradation, high 
inflation and high youth unemployment. Unwillingness to resolve these shortcomings will 
exact long-term costs. Just as important are systemic problems in credit markets and risky 
demonstration projects particularly in infrastructure, to which makeshift solutions such as the 
recent guarantee fund or overly generous Treasury insurances cannot provide durable 
answers. These will continue to pose structural risks to firms as well as the banking system. 
Underestimating the scale of foreign capital dependence and irresponsibly ignoring the 
chorus of warnings about the fragility of the Turkish economy have already proved 
destructive. Insisting further on the present policy path will only lead to a long-term pattern 
with alternating episodes of persistent underperformance and periodic downturns, entrapping 
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Table 1.  Turkey: Selected Indicators (2002-2016) 
  2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
GDP (US$ Billions) 232.5 303 392.2 483 530.9 647.2 730.3 614.5 731.2 774.8 788.9 823.3 799.5 859.4 863.4 
GDP Per Capita (US$) 3,571 4,587 5,856 7,117 7,727 9,310 10,382 8,624 10,112 10,584 10,646 10,975 10,530 10,915 10,817 
GDP Growth (%) 6.2 5.3 9.4 8.4 6.9 4.7 0.7 -4.8 9.2 8.8 2.1 4.2 2.9 6.1 3.2 
Imports (US$ Billions) 51.5 69.3 97.5 116.8 139.6 170.1 202.0 140.9 185.5 240.8 236.5 251.7 242.2 207.2 198.6 
Exports (US$ Billions) 36.1 47.3 63.2 73.5 85.5 107.3 132.0 102.1 113.9 134.9 152.5 151.8 157.6 143.8 142.5 
Current Account Balance  (%GDP) -0.3 -2.5 -3.7 -4.6 -6.1 -5.8 -5.5  -1.97 -6.2 -9.7 -6.1 -7.9 -5.8 -3.7 -3.8 
FDI (US$ Billions) 0.9 1.2 2.0 8.9 19.2 19.9 17.3 7.0 7.6 13.8 9.5 9.3 5.8 12.5 9.7 
Fiscal Balance (%GDP) -11.4 -8.8 -5.4 -1.2 -0.6 -1.6 -1.8 -5.5 -3.6 -1.3 -2.0 -1.2 -1.3 -2.0 -2.5 
Total Public Debt (%GDP)  70.9 63.5 57.8 52.2 46.4 40.4 41.2 47.7 44.4 41.2 38.8 38.8 35.9 27.5 28.1 
Public Foreign Debt (US$ billions) 64.5 70.8 75.7 70.4 71.6 73.5 78.3 83.5 89.1 94.3 104.0 115.9 117.7 113.1 119.8 
Private Foreign Debt (US$ billions) 43.1 48.9 64.1 84.9 120.8 160.7 188.5 172.3 191.4 200.1 228.5 268.7 282.3 281.9 307.9 
Consumer Inflation % 45.0 18.4 9.4 7.7 9.7 8.4 10.1 6.5 6.4 10.4 6.2 7.4 8.2 7.7 7.8 
Unemployment % 10.3 10.5 10.3 10.6 10.2 10.3 11.0 14.0 11.9 9.8 9.2 9.7 9.9 10.3 10.9 
 
Sources: Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey; IMF; TURKSTAT; World Bank. Note that in late 2016 the Turkish Statistical Institute announced a major update of its 
national accounts methodology, which led to a significant and highly contested upward revision of GDP figures from 2009 onwards. GDP-related data in this table retains the 
old series for 2002-2014, using new series only for 2015 and 2016.      
 
 
 
 
 
